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I. INTRODUCTION
As the Schiavo case' became increasingly controversial, my first
reaction was: "They can't do this. The law in Florida and almost every-
where else is clear that they can't." But as the litigating continued - and
continued and continued, as did the legislating - the same thoughts
crossed my mind that crossed the minds of so many others, who
expressed their thoughts privately and publicly, in letters to the editor,
radio talk shows, television news stories, Web postings, and blogs: Why
not let Terri's parents take her home and care for her? What would be
wrong with that? Why is Terri Schiavo's husband, Michael Schiavo,
fighting her parents, Bob and Mary Schindler, tooth and nail? If he
wants to get on with his life after more than a decade, that is fine. No
one begrudges him that. This is a case where you can have your cake
and eat it, too. Terri's parents are not merely willing, but eager to care
for her. Michael can obtain a divorce and remarry.2
* Professor of Law and Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote Professor of Bioethics, University of
Pittsburgh School of Law and Center for Bioethics and Health Law.
1. Or perhaps more accurately, the Schiavo cases. The ones with which I am concerned
here, those litigating substantive end-of-life law, are In re Guardianship of Schiavo (Schiavo I),
780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001), and In re Guardianship ofSchiavo (Schiavo 11), 792
So. 2d 551 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001). The Schiavo litigation requires a roadmap to navigate.
Fortunately, there is an excellent one. See Kathy Cerminara & Kenneth Goodman, Schiavo Case
Resources, Key Events in the Case of Theresa Marie Schiavo (2006), http://www6.miami.edu/
ethics/schiavo/timeline.htm.
2. If Michael were to obtain a divorce, he would lose his right to inherit by intestacy
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But Michael Schiavo claimed not merely to be fighting for what he
thought was right, but also for what he claimed Terri wanted for herself.
His position was that it was not a vindication of his interests that he
sought, but hers. And he was fighting not only for Terri, but for a prin-
ciple - that the wishes of patients who are unable (and never will be
able) to speak for themselves be respected. This being the case, giving
in to the Schindlers was not having his cake and eating it, too. It was not
even a compromise. It was a sellout: a betrayal of Terri and a betrayal
of a principle.
There were really two Schiavo cases - the private one and the pub-
lic one. The private case was the dispute between Michael Schiavo and
the Schindlers about whether to maintain Terri's existence in a persistent
vegetative state ("PVS").3 The public case concerned Florida law and
its possible effect on the law in other jurisdictions. It also concerned
important principles. From Michael Schiavo's perspective, it was the
principle of autonomy - the right of competent adults to refuse all forms
of medical treatment and the right of incompetent adult patients to make
those decisions in advance and have them carried out by their surrogates.
From the Schindlers' perspective, it was the principle of vitalism - that
all human life is priceless and maximum efforts must always be made to
sustain it. Letting the Schindlers take on all responsibility for Terri
might have sufficed in 1995 or 2000, but by 2005 the public case had
taken on a life of its own. It became impossible to settle the private case
without compromising principles.
In this Article, I will identify and discuss the harms that would have
occurred had the Schindlers won - the harms both to Terri Schiavo in
the private case and the larger set of harms to public policy in the public
case. The Schindlers fought Michael Schiavo on a variety of bat-
tlegrounds - the Florida courts, the Florida legislative and executive
branches, the federal courts, and eventually Congress. Had they defini-
tively prevailed in any of these forums, the consequences for end-of-life
decisionmaking would have been largely the same. Had they prevailed
in Congress or even in the state legislative and executive branches, how-
ever, the consequences would have implicated issues beyond end-of-life
whatever sum, if any, remaining in the trust established by the award from the malpractice suit
brought on Terri Schiavo's behalf, and her parents would inherit the sum. Schiavo 1, 780 So. 2d at
178. However, the court concluded that there is "no evidence . . . that either Michael or the
Schindlers seek monetary gain from their actions." id.
3. For a recent and comprehensive discussion of PVS, see James L. Bernat, Chronic
Disorders of Consciousness, 367 LANCEI 1181 (2006). A recent study suggests that patients in a
minimally conscious state, which involves less severe brain damage than a PVS, may be capable
of regenerating segments of brain cells. See Henning U. Voss et al., Possible Axonal Regrowth in
Late Recovery from the Minimally Conscious State, 116 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 2005 (2006).
[Vol. 61:733
2007] SUPPOSE THE SCHINDLERS HAD WON THE SCHIAVO CASE 735
decisionmaking, potentially altering the balance among legislative, exec-
utive, and judicial power and between federal and state power. Separa-
tion of powers and federalism, however, are not the topics I will address.
II. THE PRIVATE CASE: WHAT Is THE HARM? WHAT Is
THE PRINCIPLE?
Was the principle involved in the Schiavo case - at least as Michael
Schiavo saw it - merely promisekeeping? Michael Schiavo claimed that
he promised Terri he would never allow this kind of thing to happen to
her. So to entrust her parents with her care - the same parents who
proclaimed that they would prevent her death by refusing to remove her
feeding tube - would have involved breaking that promise.
Who would dispute that promisekeeping is important and a value
worthy of societal protection? Nonetheless, we know that not all
promises can be kept - especially as time goes on and conditions
change. Furthermore, even if we do not know in fact, we are at least on
notice that the law does not enforce all promises. Sometimes the law
does not even permit promises to be kept, evidence of which abounds in
a variety of substantive legal areas. In fact, the law is frequently
invoked to prevent promisekeeping.
However, assuming that Michael Schiavo made such a promise to
Terri Schiavo, it might prove instructive to understand why it was
requested and why it was granted. Many people say something like, "if
I'm ever in that fill-in-the-blank condition, I don't want to be kept alive
like that." They say it after visiting a sick or dying person,4 they say it
after watching a television program about this subject, or they say it in
academic or formal discussions.'
Why do people make such statements? There is no single reason,
and sometimes more than one can be at work in a particular instance.
The most obvious, perhaps, is to forestall the suffering that they expect
to experience if they are "kept alive like that." Another is that they
consider existence in such a seriously compromised state to be undigni-
fied or purposeless.
People also make such statements to avoid imposing further suffer-
ing on their families, friends, and other loved ones. Serious illness can
take a tremendous emotional and financial toll on those who are close to
a patient. Sometimes such illness takes an additional toll on the health
of others, especially if those others provide personal care for people who
are living at home with a serious terminal illness over a long period of
4. See, e.g., In re Westchester County Med. Ctr. ex rel. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 614
(N.Y. 1988).
5. See, e.g., In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 68 (N.Y. 1981).
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time. But even'when a dying person is in a hospital or nursing home,
the emotional toll and the financial cost can be severe. Some people just
do not believe it is worthwhile to extend their own lives, with a seriously
impaired quality of life, at the expense of bankrupting their families
financially, emotionally, or both.
There is another financial reason people make such statements, but
the concern is far broader than the financial impact on their families. In
fact, such concerns may more likely be voiced by people whose own
resources or public or private entitlements (including health insurance
and long-term-care insurance) are adequate to protect them and their
families from health-induced insolvency. This objection to treatment
arises from a concern about the wise use of societal, rather than individ-
ual, resources. When there are so many unmet healthcare (or other
social) needs, it seems extravagantly wasteful to some to expend large
sums to keep one person alive for a short time or in a seriously impaired
condition. Better, they believe, that such scarce resources be spent on
other people for whom the benefit will be far greater.
The first of these treatment objections does not seem to apply to a
PVS patient like Terri Schiavo. What harm would treatment pose for
her, a person who could perceive no pain, who could experience no suf-
fering?6 Furthermore, in Terri Schiavo's case her family did not face
financial insolvency because the proceeds of a lawsuit were financing
her care.7 If Terri Schiavo had been kept alive in a PVS, it would have
taken no physical toll on Michael Schiavo because her parents sought to
care for her. And it would have exacted no unwanted physical toll on
her parents because they volunteered for that duty. Keeping her alive
would have meant that her husband failed to fulfill his promise, which
might have imposed some emotional toll on him. But, as mentioned
6. There is virtually no responsible scientific opinion claiming that persons in a PVS can
experience anything, let alone pain:
The Multisociety Task Force acknowledged the biological limitations to knowing
categorically that patients with vegetative state lack all awareness or capacity for
suffering or experience because one person cannot directly experience the conscious
life of another. We can only interact with another person and make a reasoned
judgment about their cognitive life on the basis of the quality of their responses to
our stimuli. That we incorrectly deny the presence of their conscious life when it
exists simply because we cannot measure it is, therefore, possible. Despite this
limitation, there are compelling reasons to conclude that patients in vegetative state
utterly lack sentience based on neuroimaging, evoked potential, and
neuropathological data.
Bernat, supra note 3, at 1183. But see Christian J. Borthwick, The Permanent Vegetative State:
Ethical Crux, Medical Fiction?, 12 IssuEs L. & MED. 167, 175 (1996) ("It is possible that
hundreds of patients across the USA are suffering untreated pain because their physicians have
relied on the Multi-Society Task Force Consensus Statement.").
7. Schiavo 1, 780 So. 2d at 178.
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above, sometimes there are overriding interests in breaking promises.
And the only emotional cost to her parents would have arisen after Terri
died, not if she continued living.
But this only considers others' interests. What about Terri Schi-
avo's interests? Some would assert a "no-interests" position - that Terri
Schiavo, as a person in a PVS, had no personal interests once her cogni-
tive faculties departed this world, leaving only her body behind.8 How-
ever, some believe that she had interests that survived her loss of
cognitive functioning. The principle involved, simply put, is respect for
Terri Schiavo's wishes.
Prominent among the dissenters from the no-interests position are
Justices John Paul Stevens and the late William Brennan, who were lit-
erally just that - dissenters in Cruzan9 - and who explained their posi-
tion somewhat more richly. The harm was to Terri's memory; she had
an interest in being remembered as the vibrant person she was rather
than as the shell of a person she had become. To perpetuate her corpo-
real existence against her previously expressed wishes was to perpetuate
the former and in the process to do further harm to the latter. Speaking
of Nancy Cruzan in particular - but in terms applicable to any patient in
a PVS, or indeed any person who wishes to forgo life-sustaining medical
treatment - Justice Stevens wrote: "Insofar as Nancy Cruzan has an
interest in being remembered for how she lived rather than how she
died, the damage done to those memories by the prolongation of her
death is irreversible."'10 Echoing these thoughts, Justice Brennan wrote:
"An erroneous decision not to terminate life support... robs a patient of
the very qualities protected by the right to avoid unwanted medical treat-
ment. His own degraded existence is perpetuated; his family's suffering
is protracted; the memory he leaves behind becomes more and more
distorted."''
Furthermore, the harm is not merely to the person whose wishes are
8. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities
and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIz. L. REV. 373, 385 (1986) ("[p]rivacy, bodily integrity,
pain, and suffering could no longer matter to" a person in a comatose condition); Nancy K.
Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 400 (1988) ("At the very least, a
necessary condition for having interests would seem to be the capacity to experience pleasant and
unpleasant sensations. Interests, in other words, presuppose consciousness ...."); John A.
Robertson, Cruzan and the Constitutional Status of Nontreatment Decisions for Incompetent
Patients, 25 GA. L. REV. 1139, 1157 (1991) ("Irreversibly comatose patients, by definition, have
no interests in their present condition, because they lack the mental substrate essential to the
possession of interests.").
9. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
10. Id. at 353 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L.
CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING 4-58, -60, -61 (3d
ed. 2004 & Supp. 2005).
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disrespected. If not a present harm, it is at least a potential harm to all
who wish to have their end-of-life treatment preferences honored. This
group now lives with the concern (if not fear) that their wishes may at
some future time be dishonored, or may only be honored through a judi-
cial proceeding, public spectacle, or an advance directive that has all of
its legal i's dotted and its t's crossed. Had the Schindlers won - had
people in a PVS been required to be kept alive - this would have been a
consequence.
III. THE PUBLIC CASE: SCHIAVO'S IMPACT ON THE LEGAL
CONSENSUS ABOUT END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING
In the decade and a half between the Quinlan2 and Cruzan13 cases,
a consensus developed in the United States about how medical decisions
near the end of one's life should be made. The consensus can be sum-
marized as follows:
1) competent individuals have a legal right to refuse treatment;
2) incompetent individuals have a right to have treatment refused for
them;
3) end-of-life decisions should ordinarily be made in clinical settings
and not courts;
4) close family members have the legal authority to act as surrogates
and make medical decisions for patients who lack decisionmaking
capacity;
5) in making end-of-life decisions, surrogates should apply the sub-
stituted judgment standard;
6) surrogates may rely on advance directives to ascertain patients'
wishes;
7) artificial nutrition and hydration are medical treatments; and
8) actively hastening death is impermissible.
14
The consensus grew incrementally as various healthcare profes-
sional organizations, government commissions,' 5  academic think
12. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
13. Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261.
14. I discuss the legal consensus at length in Alan Meisel, The Legal Consensus About
Forgoing Life-Sustaining Treatment: Its Status and Its Prospects, 2 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J.
309, 315 (1992). See also MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 11, at 2-4 to -6.
15. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. &
BIOMED. & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT (1983)
[hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, DECIDING TO FOREGO]; N.J. COMM'N ON LEGAL & ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN THE DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE, THE NEW JERSEY ADVANCE DIRECTIVES FOR
HEALTH CARE AND DECLARATION OF DEATH AcTs: STATUTES, COMMENTARIES, AND ANALYSES
(1991); N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, WHEN OTHERS MUST CHOOSE: DECIDING
FOR PATIENTS WITHOUT CAPACITY (1992); N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT: MAKING DECISIONS AND APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT (1987).
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tanks, 6 and religious institutions 7 issued reports and policy statements
consistent with the summary noted above. Courts issued decisions and
legislatures enacted statutes that enshrined the consensus with a degree
of credibility that would have otherwise been lacking, and the public
became increasingly aware of these issues through media reports and
personal experience.
The consensus also grew iteratively. The courts were strongly
influenced by government-commission reports, 8 public-policy state-
ments, and positions taken by professional' 9 and, perhaps to a degree,
religious organizations. In turn, the professional and religious organiza-
tions were undoubtedly influenced by judicial decisions and perhaps by
legislation. The public, too, became increasingly aware of these devel-
opments through the mass media and likely incorporated elements of the
consensus in their own end-of-life decisions and those of family mem-
bers. Likewise, this process served to educate the healthcare profession-
als involved in those decisions.
Thus, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Cruzan ° in 1990, its
decision was largely a reflection of the consensus that was already in
place. On substantive end-of-life decisionmaking issues, Cruzan broke
no new ground.2' In the decade and a half since the Cruzan decision,
the consensus has been reiterated time and time again by various
16. See, e.g., HASTINGS CTR., GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 31 (1987); NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
GUIDELINES FOR STATE COURT DECISION MAKING IN LIFE-SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT
CASES (1991).
17. 70TH GENERAL CONVENTION, ESTABLISH PRINCIPLES WITH REGARD TO THE
PROLONGATION OF LIFE, J. OF THE GEN. CONVENTION OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, PHOENIX, 1991,
at 383 (1992), available at http://www.episcopalchurch.org/3577_60370_ENGHTM.htm; 200TH
GEN. ASSEMBLY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.), LIFE ABUNDANT: VALUES, CHOICES
AND HEALTH CARE - THE RESPONSIBILITY AND ROLE OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.)
(1988), http://www.pcusa.org/nationalhealth/policies/policy-affirmation.htm; CATECHISM OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2278, http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0O15/_P7Z.HTM; COMM. ON
JEWISH LAW & STANDARDS OF THE RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY, JEWISH MED. DIRECTIVES FOR
HEALTH CARE 3 (1994), http://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/docs/medical%20directives.pdf; 5
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 2708 (Warren Thomas Reich ed., rev. ed. 1995) (discussing the
Muslim position); GEN. ASSEMBLY, UNION FOR REFORM JUDAISM, COMPASSIONATE AND COMFORT
CARE DECISIONS AT THE END OF LIFE (1995), http://www.urj.us/cgi-bin/resodisp.pl?file=care&
year=1995; STANLEY S. HARAKAS, CONTEMPORARY MORAL ISSUES FACING THE ORTHODOX
CHRISTIANS 176 (1982). See generally A. Mark Clarfield et al., Ethical Issues in End-of-Life
Geriatric Care: The Approach of Three Monotheistic Religions - Judaism, Catholicism, and
Islam, 51 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC'Y 1149, 1151-52 (2003).
18. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
19. See, e.g., CODE OF MED. ETHICS § 2.22 (Am. Med. Ass'n 1994).
20. 497 U.S. 261 (1990),
21. Cruzan merely held that the Fourteenth Amendment permits states to adopt a clear and
convincing evidence standard of proof of an incompetent patient's wish to forgo life-sustaining
treatment. Id. at 284.
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courts2 2 and has become increasingly well-accepted, probably even in
the states in which there has been no definitive appellate court opinion
on end-of-life decisionmaking. Naturally, not everyone agrees with the
consensus, 23 and the consensus has included contentious aspects from
the outset.24 Nonetheless, these contentious aspects do not undermine
the consensus' existence. Consensus, after all, does not require
unanimity.
There are several important points to note regarding the consensus'
embodiment in the law. End-of-life decisionmaking law is primarily
judge-made law, most of which is state law. Although state legislatures
(and more infrequently, Congress) 25 have engaged in some lawmaking
regarding end-of-life matters, the task of lawmaking has been left mostly
to the courts, which have reluctantly (or so they often profess) filled the
breach.26
Another interesting characteristic many end-of-life judicial deci-
sions share is their comprehensiveness. Courts have frequently issued
sweeping opinions that are much broader than needed to decide the issue
before them. In many cases, the decisions read like legal manuals for
22. See, e.g., Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993); In re Tavel, 661 A.2d 1061
(Del. 1995); In re Guardianship of Schiavo (Schiavo 1), 780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2001). Ironically, the consensus was largely solidified before the Supreme Court's decision in
Cruzan. Subsequent to that decision, only one state has joined the consensus. See In re Fiori, 652
A.2d 1350, 1357 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). Nonetheless, to date, no state has repudiated the
consensus' main points.
23. See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 8, at 379 ("[B]ecause of the primacy it awards to the
incompetent patient's past preferences, the substituted judgment standard joins the advance
directive in facing an even greater threat to its moral authority."); Louise Harmon, Falling off the
Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 61 (1990) ("The
doctrine of substituted judgment allows the state to invade the bodily integrity of the incompetent
without having to justify the invasion."); Rhoden, supra note 8, at 380 ("[C]ourts have distorted
our vision of incompetent patients by downplaying the ways in which incompetent patients
inevitably differ from competent ones.").
24. See In re Conservatorship of Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, 170 (Cal. 2001); In re Martin, 538
N.W.2d 399, 407-08 (Mich. 1995); In re Guardianship of Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485, 489-90
(Wis. 1997).
25. There are only two major federal statutes dealing with end-of-life decisionmaking:
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990)
(codified as amended in relevant part at 42 U.S.C. 1395cc(f)(1) & 1396a(a) (2000)) (popularly
known as the Patient Self-Determination Act), dealing with advance directives, and the 1984
Amendments to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat.
1749, tit. 1, §§ 121-128 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
26. Any number of courts have extended invitations to their respective legislatures to enact
statutes governing end-of-life decisionmaking. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr.
484, 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) ("If specific procedural rules are to be adopted in this area in order
to protect the public interest, they must necessarily come from that body most suited for the
collection of data and the reaching of a consensus - the Legislature.").
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end-of-life decisionmaking.27 It is hard to divine the reasons for this
trend, but one possibility is the failure of legislatures to address the mat-
ter in a comprehensive manner. Thus, judges may feel that if they do
not treat the issue thoroughly, dying patients, their families, and their
healthcare providers will find themselves in a legal limbo. Perhaps
another reason for these broad opinions is the interest the subject pro-
vokes. Some judges seem positively enthralled by the possibility of
writing a treatise on this fascinating, controversial, and knotty subject. It
may be a welcome change of pace from writing about commercial dis-
putes, personal injury, and the myriad other dry or well-trod topics that
populate a judicial docket. Nonetheless, it is doubtful that the judges'
willingness to hand down codes for end-of-life decisionmaking has
caused the legislatures to back away from the issue. Indeed, even in
those states in which there is no end-of-life appellate decision, the legis-
latures have stayed their hand no less than in states where the courts
have had occasion to speak.
IV. SCHINDLERS' LIST, OR THE ANTI-CONSENSUS
The Schindlers' claims posed a significant challenge to a number of
the legal consensus' central aspects regarding end-of-life decisionmak-
ing. Even though the consensus' most fundamental element - namely,
the right of competent patients to refuse treatment - was not at issue, the
Schindlers took direct or indirect aim at the consensus. Had they pre-
vailed, a number of the consensus' essential features would have been
overturned in Florida and seriously threatened elsewhere.
A. The Right Not to Be Treated
The consensus' most fundamental aspect is that patients possessing
decisionmaking capacity (competent patients) have a virtually absolute
right to refuse medical treatment.28 Decisionmaking for competent
patients tends to be far less problematic than decisionmaking for incom-
petent patients simply because competent patients, ex hypothesi, can
make their own decisions. Incompetent patients cannot, hence their
comparable right to have a surrogate make treatment decisions in their
stead. In deciding for the incompetent patient, the surrogate - like the
competent patient making his or her own decision - may make a deci-
sion to decline treatment, although the surrogate's discretion is signifi-
27. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990); In re Conroy, 486
A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
28. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) ("The principle that a
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.").
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
cantly more constrained than that of a competent patient. In any event,
there is no imperative that hopelessly ill patients be kept alive under all
circumstances.
Patients who have made their wishes known before losing decision-
making capacity - whether through a written advance directive2 9 or an
oral statement30 - have the right to forgo life-sustaining medical treat-
ment, assuming they have done so with the requisite precision, clarity,
and weight. For a patient who has not made his or her wishes known in
this manner, a surrogate may make a decision on the patient's behalf to
forgo treatment if the treatment is not in the patient's best interest. This
ethical principle has been accepted in law in some jurisdictions - includ-
ing those that require adherence to the highest standards of precision,
clarity, and weight a.3  Courts have authorized end-of-life decisionmak-
ing in accordance with a "best interest" standard, through which the
decisionmaker weighs the benefits and burdens that continued existence
poses for the patient.32 Courts have been clear in condemning decision-
making based on the societal worth of the patient's existence.33
The question whether non-sentient existence (the condition of a
patient in a PVS) constitutes a benefit could be debated endlessly. From
a legal perspective, however, the issue has been settled since Quinlan
was decided in 1976. 34 In holding that it was permissible to remove life
support from a person in a PVS and allow the person to die as a conse-
quence of that removal, the Quinlan court implied that existence per se
is not necessarily beneficial to a non-sentient person.35 Courts have uni-
formly - and sometimes more explicitly than in Quinlan - adhered to
that conclusion. They do not consider "mere biological existence"3 6 to
be a benefit sufficient to warrant a determination that the person must be
kept alive.37 Indeed, there is even a colorable argument that being kept
29. See infra Part I1D.
30. See infra Part III.C.
31. See In re Westchester County Med. Ctr. ex rel. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 614 (N.Y.
1988); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that if the clear and convincing
standard cannot be met to show that the patient did not or would not consent to the treatment, the
decision whether to treat must be made in accordance with the State's interests in protecting its
citizens' health and welfare).
32. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Conroy,
486 A.2d at 1240; see also CODE OF MED. ETHICS § 2.20 (Am. Med. Ass'n 2007).
33. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1232-33 ("[W]e expressly decline to authorize
decision-making based on assessments of the personal worth or social utility of another's life, or
the value of that life to others."). See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 11, at 4-70 to -
71 (collecting cases).
34. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976).
35. Id.
36. Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
37. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BioETHIcs, TAKING CARE: ETHICAL CAREGIVING IN OUR
AGING SOCIETY 212 (2005), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/taking-care/ ("Caring
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alive under such circumstances constitutes a detriment to the patient.
38
Had the Schindlers won, the legal consensus on this point would
have been thrown into a sea of confusion. The vitalist perspective - that
life per se, even nonsentient life, is a pearl beyond price and that we
must not spare any effort to maintain it, even when the person being kept
alive would not have wanted to be kept alive in such circumstances or
when there is no benefit to the patient to being kept alive - would have
been validated.
B. Decisionmaking Standards
One who makes decisions for a person lacking decisionmaking
capacity39 (generically referred to as a surrogate)4" must be guided by
some legal standard.4' In the absence of a standard, a surrogate would
wield absolute authority over decisions regarding life-sustaining medical
treatment for the incompetent patient. When there is an articulated stan-
dard, however, the surrogate's discretion is circumscribed and the deci-
well for the patient does not require always choosing interventions that would prolong his life or
delay his dying, and sometimes best care requires forgoing treatments that may sustain life at the
cost of imposing undue misery or offering palliative care that accepts an increased risk of an
earlier death."); see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 331 (1990) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("The Court ...permits the State's abstract, undifferentiated interest in the
preservation of life to overwhelm the best interests of Nancy Beth Cruzan, interests which would,
according to an undisputed finding, be served by allowing her guardians to exercise her
constitutional right to discontinue medical treatment."). See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA,
supra note 11, at 4-77 (collecting cases).
38. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 310 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Dying is personal. And it is
profound. For many, the thought of an ignoble end, steeped in decay, is abhorrent."); id. at 344
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Nancy Cruzan's interest in life, no less than that of any other person,
includes an interest in how she will be thought of after her death by those whose opinions
mattered to her. There can be no doubt that her life made her dear to her family and to others.
How she dies will affect how that life is remembered.").
39. Traditionally such persons have been referred to as "incompetent persons," but in the last
two or three decades there has been a terminological shift toward referring to them as
"incapacitated persons" or the lengthier locution of "persons who lack decisionmaking capacity."
See generally SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL, JOHN PARRY & BARBARA A. WEINER, THE MENTALLY
DISABLED AND THE LAW 369 (3d ed. 1985).
40. The nomenclature in most states for such a person is a "surrogate." However, in Florida,
the statute uses the term "proxy" as the generic name for anyone who makes a decision for an
incompetent patient. § 765.101(15), FLA. STAT. (2006). In most other states, proxy is used to
refer to a specific kind of surrogate, namely one appointed by a patient while competent to make
such an appointment. To confuse matters further, Florida uses the term "surrogate" to refer to a
patient-appointed agent. § 765.101(16).
41. Although it has never been directly litigated, this is probably a constitutional necessity;
the failure to have some standard could constitute a denial of due process of law. See 1 LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-4, at 12 (3d ed. 2000). However, this assumes
that decisions of a surrogate decisionmaker constitute state action, which is not at all clear. See
MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 11, at 2-32 to -33.
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sion must conform to certain criteria - criteria implicit or explicit in the
standard.
1. SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS
The predominant standard courts and legislatures have adopted for
surrogate decisionmaking is referred to as the "substituted judgment"
standard.42 This standard, pronounced in Quinlan, is the decisionmak-
ing linchpin for patients who lack decisionmaking capacity. All but two
appellate courts43 have accepted it as the default standard for guiding
surrogates in making end-of-life decisions.'
The substituted judgment standard has been described in a variety
of ways. One complicated rendition requires that the surrogate's deci-
sion comport with that of the incompetent patient, were he or she com-
petent, taking into account current and future incompetency.45 The
President's Commission supplied a much cleaner version, requiring that
the surrogate's decision correspond to what the incompetent patient
would have preferred in advance of losing decisionmaking capacity had
he or she given thought to the matter.46 Put most simply, the substituted
42. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 666 (N.J. 1976).
43. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (requiring evidence of an incapacitated
person's wishes before permitting withdrawal of artificial hydration and nutrition), questioned in
In re Warren, 858 S.W.2d 263, 265-66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); In re Westchester County Med. Ctr.
ex rel. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988).
44. The Florida Supreme Court adopted this standard in In re Guardianship of Browning, 568
So. 2d 4, 13 (Fla. 1990), stating that "[iln this state, we have adopted a concept of substituted
judgment. One does not exercise another's right of self-determination or fulfill that person's right
of privacy by making a decision which the state, the family, or public opinion would prefer. The
surrogate decisionmaker must be confident that he or she can and is voicing the patient's
decision." (emphasis and internal citations omitted). Of the 39 jurisdictions with surrogate
decisionmaking statutes, 18 specify a substantive standard to guide surrogate decisionmaking, and
most of these prescribe a substituted judgment standard. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA,
supra note 1 1, at 8-20. The only statutes that expressly require application of a subjective
standard are those of Ohio and South Dakota. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.08(D)(2) (2005);
S.D. CODIIED LAWS § 34-12C-3 (1994). However, if this standard cannot be met, Ohio permits
the substituted judgment standard to be applied, whereas in South Dakota the best interest
standard may be applied without first attempting to apply a substituted judgment standard.
§ 2133.08(D)(3); § 34-12C-3.
45. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (Mass.
1977) ("[T]he decision in cases such as this should be that which would be made by the
incompetent person, if that person were competent, but taking into account the present and future
incompetency of the individual as one of the factors which would necessarily enter into the
decisionmaking process of the competent person."); see also In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664 ("The
only practical way to prevent destruction of the right is to permit the guardian and family of Karen
to render their best judgment, subject to the qualifications hereinafter stated, as to whether she
would exercise it in these circumstances.").
46. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 15, at 132 ("The substituted
judgment standard requires that a surrogate attempt to reach the decision that the incapacitated
person would make if he or she were able to choose.").
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judgment standard seeks to determine the now-incompetent patient's
probable wishes concerning treatment.
The widespread acceptance of the substituted judgment standard
does not however make it sacrosanct, as illustrated by its outright rejec-
tion by the New York Court of Appeals,4 7 its ambiguous status in Mis-
souri,4 8 and its rejection in a limited class of cases in California,
Michigan, and Wisconsin.49 The autonomy principle depends on estab-
lishing certainty about what the patient's wishes would be if the patient
were competent to express them. Some claim this principle is better
honored by the "clear and convincing evidence" standard,5" also known
by its more preferable label, the "subjective" standard."' This standard
requires knowledge of the patient's actual wishes about treatment rather
than the substituted judgment standard's determination of probable
wishes. Under the strictest rendition of the subjective standard, the
patient must have actually made a treatment decision while possessing
decisionmaking capacity, that is, before the need for the decision actu-
ally arose.52 Furthermore, this decision must have been made in a con-
text of solemnity and not as an offhand comment.
53
Under the subjective standard's strict formulation, the surrogate is
nothing more than a messenger bearing the patient's prior-made deci-
sion.54 Under a somewhat looser formulation - which brings the subjec-
47. In re O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 613.
48. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d 408 (requiring evidence of an incapacitated person's wishes before
permitting withdrawal of artificial hydration and nutrition), questioned in In re Warren, 858
S.W.2d 263, 265-66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
• 49. These are cases involving so-called minimally conscious patients. See In re
Conservatorship of Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, 171-73 (Cal. 2001); In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399,
407 (Mich. 1995); In re Guardianship of Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485, 489-90 (Wis. 1997).
50. Some courts use the term "subjective standard." See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209,
1229 (N.J. 1985). Other judges have used the terms "specific-subjective-intent," "actual intent,"
and "present subjective intent." See In re O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 616-17 (Hancock, J.,
concurring).
51. The term "clear and convincing evidence" standard is best avoided because it signifies an
evidentiary standard rather than a substantive standard for decisionmaking by a surrogate for a
patient lacking decisionmaking capacity. See Martin, 538 N.W.2d at 406 n.12. There are several
possible evidentiary standards; besides the clear and convincing evidence standard, the common
evidentiary standards are "beyond a reasonable doubt" and "preponderance of evidence." There
are also a number of possible substantive standards: the subjective standard, the substituted
judgment standard, and the best interest standard. Each substantive standard can be modified by
one of the adjectival standards of evidence law. For instance, in theory a court could require that
in order to make a particular treatment decision for an incompetent patient, there be clear and
convincing evidence of the patient's actual subjective intent. See, e.g., In re O'Connor, 531
N.E.2d at 613.
52. See In re O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 613.
53. Id.
54. One exception to this may be the situation where a patient has executed a "proxy
directive" naming a proxy and expressly authorizing him or her to make end-of-life decisions, but
without giving specific guidance as to what those decisions should be (i.e., a healthcare power of
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tive standard closer to the substituted judgment standard - the surrogate
is entitled to infer the patient's wishes from conversations the now-
incompetent patient had regarding others' treatment before the patient
lost his or her decisionmaking capacity."
Most courts prefer the greater degree of certainty the subjective
standard provides,56 but apply a less stringent standard on pragmatic
grounds - namely, that most people simply do not make the effort to
articulate their wishes with the clarity and certainty the subjective stan-
dard requires.57 In most jurisdictions, this means that the substituted
judgment standard governs end-of-life decisionmaking.
Less than a handful of cases5 8 have challenged the application of
the substituted judgment standard to a limited class of cases - namely,
attorney without a living will). The New York Court of Appeals, the very same court to require
the subjective standard, seems to permit this exception as well. Id. at 612 n.2; see also Cruzan v.
Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[S]uch a duty
may well be constitutionally required [for a state to give effect to the decisions of a surrogate
decisionmaker] to protect the patient's liberty interest in refusing medical treatments."); id. at 328
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he State generally must either repose the choice with the person
whom the patient himself would most likely have chosen as proxy or leave the decision to the
patient's family."); cf. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 16 (Fla. 1990) (written
designation of a proxy "establishes a rebuttable presumption that constitutes clear and convincing
evidence of the patient's wishes"); In re Howe, No. 03 P 1255, 2004 WL 1446057, at *19 (Mass.
Prob. & Fam. Ct. Dep't Mar. 22, 2004) ("The Hospital must comply with health care decisions
made ... under a health care proxy to the same extent as if such decisions have been made by [the
patient.]"); In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 426 (N.J. 1987) (although the relevant power of attorney
statute does not specifically authorize conveyance of durable authority to make medical decisions,
it should be interpreted that way); Pocono Med. Ctr. v. Harley, 11 Fiduc. Rep. 2d 128, 133 (Pa. Ct.
C.P. Monroe County 1990) (recognizing a duty to follow the wishes of a person holding a power
of attorney assuming the power of attorney contains certain provisions). The New York Court of
Appeals has even suggested that the oral designation of a proxy would meet the subjective
standard. In re O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 612 n.2.
55. See, e.g., In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202, 1205 (Me. 1990). But see In re O'Connor, 531
N.E.2d at 614 (holding that patient's statements made in reaction to the treatment of others do not
demonstrate a seriousness of purpose necessary to satisfy the clear and convincing evidence
standard).
56. Whether the subjective standard in fact provides a greater degree of certainty than the
substituted judgment standard is open to question. With the substituted judgment standard, the
surrogate must speculate about what the patient's wishes would be if the patient were able to
make a decision. However, under the subjective standard, the patient must speculate about what
treatment he or she would want under a variety of hypothetical future circumstances.
57. See, e.g., In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 912 (Pa. 1996) ("Were [the clear and convincing] test
to be applied, all of those patients who did not have the prescience or the sophistication to express
clearly and unmistakably their wishes on this precise matter would not be able to have life support
removed.").
58. See supra note 44; see also In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229, 1231-32 (N.J. 1985)
(rejecting substituted judgment standard for a minimally conscious patient in favor of a subjective
standard - though a version more loosely formulated than those in other states - but holding that
if subjective standard could not be met, best interest standard would be applied, which does not
necessarily require the continued administration of treatment).
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those involving minimally conscious patients.5 9 These patients, like
PVS patients, have suffered serious brain damage but to a lesser degree.
Unlike PVS patients, minimally conscious patients, as the label sug-
gests, have some cognitive functioning and some awareness of their
surroundings.
2. EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS
The tendency to conflate substantive standards with evidentiary
standards has confounded the question of which standards should guide
decisionmaking for incompetent patients. Whatever the substantive
standard is - subjective, substituted judgment, best interest, or some-
thing else - the standard must be established by some degree of cer-
tainty. As is the case in all litigation, it must be established in
accordance with some evidentiary standard. The evidentiary standard
ordinarily applied in civil litigation is preponderance of the evidence.
However, in end-of-life litigation, since the question was first raised,6'
courts have rejected the preponderance of the evidence standard and
applied the clear and convincing evidence standard. 6'
During the Schiavo litigation's earlier stages, the Schindlers did not
challenge the substituted judgment standard as the appropriate decision-
making standard. Rather, they claimed that the appropriate evidentiary
standard had not been met - i.e., Terri's desire to have life support ter-
minated was not established by clear and convincing evidence. 62  This
claim highlights the distinction between the substantive standard (substi-
tuted judgment standard) and the evidentiary standard (clear and con-
59. See Joseph T. Giacino et al., The Minimally Conscious State: Definition and Diagnostic
Criteria, 58 NEUROLOGY 349, 350-51 (2002).
60. See In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72 (1981).
61. There is much confusion in the case law and the commentary about the difference
between the substantive standard for end-of-life decisionmaking by surrogates and the evidentiary
standard. A few judges, however, seem to understand the difference. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir.,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 350 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("My disagreement with
the Court is thus unrelated to its endorsement of the clear and convincing standard of proof for
cases of this kind. Indeed, I agree that the controlling facts must be established with unmistakable
clarity. The critical question, however, is not how to prove the controlling facts but rather what
proven facts should be controlling."); see also In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, 406 n.12 (Mich.
1995); In re Fiori, 673 A.2d at 911 n.9 ("We note that the term 'clear and convincing evidence' in
this context refers to the requirement that the individual in question must have stated in an explicit
fashion the exact treatment desired were the patient to lapse into various medical conditions. The
term 'clear and convincing evidence' is used more commonly, however, as a burden of proof. In
that context, the standard refers to that quantum of evidence necessary for a party to establish a
point.").
62. In re Guardianship of Schiavo (Schiavo 1), 780 So. 2d 176, 179 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2001) ("Finally, the Schindlers argue that the testimony, which was conflicting, was insufficient to
support the trial court's decision by clear and convincing evidence. We have reviewed that
testimony and conclude that the trial court had sufficient evidence to make this decision.").
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vincing evidence). Florida's Second District Court of Appeal also
appreciated this distinction as indicated by the concluding paragraph of
its decision.63 The court first addressed the issue of whether the substan-
tive substituted judgment standard was met and then followed with an
analysis of whether it was met in accordance with the appropriate evi-
dentiary standard - i.e., the clear and convincing evidence standard.6
As with the substantive standard, the court found that the evidentiary
standard had been met.65
The Schindlers later seemed to change their tack; they did not,
however, explicitly argue that the substituted judgment standard should
be jettisoned in favor of the subjective standard. Instead, they attempted
to have Terri's treatment continued regardless of what she would have
wanted; the Schindlers implicitly challenged the application of the sub-
stituted judgment standard. They claimed that the subjective standard
should be applied - i.e., to terminate life support there must be clear and
convincing evidence that Terri actually made such a decision before los-
ing decisionmaking capacity. If this could not be established, then the
decision would, in default, be determined in accordance with the best
interest standard which requires that life support be continued.66
A ruling for the Schindlers would have meant a break with the pri-
macy, and perhaps ultimately erosion, of the substituted judgment stan-
dard. If this alternative scenario had occurred, the Florida courts would
have created a two-part precedent: (1) the subjective standard is the de
facto standard regarding decisionmaking for PVS patients; and (2)
should that standard not be met, the best interest standard is the default
alternative.
63. Id. at 180.
64. Id. ("In the final analysis, the difficult question that faced the trial court was whether
Theresa Marie Schindler Schiavo, not after a few weeks in a coma, but after ten years in a
persistent vegetative state that has robbed her of most of her cerebrum and all but the most
instinctive of neurological functions, with no hope of a medical cure but with sufficient money
and strength of body to live indefinitely, would choose to continue the constant nursing care and
the supporting tubes in hopes that a miracle would somehow recreate her missing brain tissue, or
whether she would wish to permit a natural death process to take its course and for her family
members and loved ones to be free to continue their lives.").
65. Id. ("After due consideration, we conclude that the trial judge had clear and convincing
evidence to answer this question as he did.").
66. See, e.g., In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73 (N.Y. 1981). There is a fundamental debate
among courts about whether the best interest standard always requires that treatment be
administered. The New York Court of Appeals, at least where the patient's life is at stake, seems
to require continued treatment. Id. However, other courts have concluded that it is not always in
a patient's best interest to be kept alive. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231-32 (N.J.
1985); In re Guardianship of Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Wash. 1984) ("[N]onintervention in
some cases may be appropriate and, therefore, in the ward's best interest."). See generally MEISEL
& CERMINARA, supra note 11, at 4-47 to -48.
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C. Surrogate Decisionmaking
One of the consensus' foundational blocks is that family members
are the natural surrogates for incapacitated patients. This means that
when a patient can no longer voice his or her own treatment wishes and
has neither left an instruction directive nor appointed a proxy, healthcare
professionals are to look to close family members to determine the
patient's wishes.
This rule is similar to the substituted judgment standard. That stan-
dard requires the surrogate to determine what treatment decision the
patient would make if he or she possessed the requisite capacity. To
make this determination, the surrogate must be knowledgeable - indeed,
possess intimate knowledge - about the patient's values, goals, interests,
and preferences: those qualities that are major determinants of patients'
medical choices.67 Courts that have accepted the substituted judgment
standard have uniformly concluded that close family members are best
equipped to make such decisions.68 Thus, the default rule is that in the
absence of an advance directive (either instruction or proxy), close fam-
ily members are legally authorized to make end-of-life treatment
decisions.
Because most people view both spouses and parents as "close fam-
ily," the prevailing common law rule provides little guidance for choos-
ing between Terri Schiavo's husband and her parents as her surrogates.
The end-of-life case law, however, prefers spouses over parents,
although the strength of this preference is unclear.69 Also, in Florida,7"
as in most other states,7 statutory law governs this matter, which tends
to follow the case law in two ways. First, authority is conferred on close
family members to make decisions for patients who lack decisionmaking
capacity. Second, spouses are explicitly given a presumptive preference
over an adult patient's parents.7" This does not mean that spouses defin-
67. See, e.g., In re Welfare of Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 747 n.4 (Wash. 1983) ("In most
instances, the familial relationship will strengthen, and not undermine, the guardian's best
judgment in exercising the personal rights of the incompetent."); see also Schiavo 1, 780 So. 2d at
178 ("When a living will or other advance directive does not exist, it stands to reason that the
surrogate decision-maker will be a person who is close to the patient and thereby likely to inherit
from the patient.").
68. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 11, at 3-50.
69. In In re Guardianship of Schiavo (Schiavo II), 792 So. 2d 551, 557 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2001), the court remarked that "it would not appear that [the Schindlers] qualified as 'next-of-kin,'
see § 744.102(12), FLA. STAT. (1997)." But, the court continued, "they were 'interested persons'
who were entitled to appear in the adversary proceeding and present their viewpoint." Id. See
generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 11, at 8-8.
70. See §§ 765.401, 765.404, FLA. STAT. (2006).
71. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 11, at 8-8.
72. § 765.401(l)(b), (l)(d).
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itively trump parents under either the statutes or the case law; rather, this
merely means that spouses are presumed, absent contrary indications, to
be the preferred surrogate decisionmaker. In other words, conditions
may exist in particular cases that rebut this presumption.73 A surrogate
decisionmaker's conflict of interest can overcome this presumption,74
and this is precisely what the Schindlers asserted during the Schiavo
litigation. They made this assertion based on the fact that upon Terri's
death, Michael Schiavo would have inherited any money remaining
from the malpractice award he had obtained on Terri's behalf for the
mishandling of her medical treatment, which had caused her PVS.
75
Had the courts accepted the Schindlers' view - that Michael Schi-
avo was burdened by a conflict of interest disqualifying him from serv-
ing as his wife's surrogate decisionmaker - the result could have set a
significant precedent for disqualifying the very people who can best
implement the substituted judgment standard: people who know the
patient and the patient's wishes extremely well, such as the patient's
spouse. Close family members will frequently have a financial conflict
of interest. If that situation presumptively disqualifies a close family
member from serving as surrogate, the disqualification would often
remove the surrogate best able to effectuate the substituted judgment
standard. 76 Thus, the effect of finding a conflict of interest would not
only have signaled a shift in the balance of surrogate decisionmaking
authority away from spouses in favor either of parents or of some larger
family unit, but would have also further undermined the substituted
judgment standard. Conversely, had the Florida courts also abandoned
the substituted judgment standard, it would have seriously eroded, or
possibly eliminated, close family members' traditional discretion to
make end-of-life decisions for their loved ones. This would have been
the case because abandoning the substituted judgment standard would
have prevented close family members from applying their knowledge of
what the patient would have wanted.
D. Advance Directives
Had the Schindlers prevailed and had the Florida courts adopted the
subjective standard for end-of-life decisionmaking cases, there would
have been profound implications for advance directives, even if limited
73. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 11, at 8-13 to -19.
74. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 11, at 3-96 to -100.
75. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo (Schiavo 1), 780 So. 2d 176, 178 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2001).
76. See, e.g., In re Welfare of Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 747 n.4 (Wash. 1983) ("In most
instances, the familial relationship will strengthen, and not undermine, the guardian's best
judgment in exercising the personal right of the incompetent.").
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in application to PVS patients. In principle, the subjective standard can
be applied in the absence of a written advance directive.77 In practice,
however, the absence of an advance directive that provides instructions
regarding future treatment 78 makes the application of the subjective stan-
dard much more difficult. Under the subjective standard, clear and con-
vincing evidence must exist of the now-incompetent patient's actual
subjective treatment wishes, as opposed to what treatment he or she
would have wanted if able to speak. Because, ex hypothesi, the incom-
petent patient is unable to express his or her wishes, the patient must
have actually made a treatment decision before losing decisionmaking
capacity in order for the subjective standard to be satisfied.
Under this standard, the degree of specificity with which the patient
must have contemplated the present situation is not entirely clear. For
example, if such a standard had been required in the Schiavo case, would
it have been necessary for Terri Schiavo to have said, before losing deci-
sionmaking capacity, "if I am ever in a persistent vegetative state being
kept alive by a feeding tube with virtually no hope of recovery, I want
the feeding tube withdrawn"? Or would less specificity have sufficed,
for example, "if I am ever in a persistent vegetative state being kept
alive by life support, I want the treatment withdrawn"? Or would even
less specificity have sufficed, for example, "if I am ever being kept alive
by life support with virtually no hope of recovery, I want the life support
withdrawn"? Or if she had directed the termination of life support if she
were ever in a PVS, would this statement apply if she were in a mini-
mally conscious state instead? Would the term "life support" have been
construed to include a feeding tube?
Courts have yet to pose and answer these questions with much pre-
cision, and hence it remains unclear what degree of specificity is
required. What is clear, however, is that the subjective standard requires
a greater degree of specificity than the substituted judgment standard.
An excellent example is the O'Connor case from New York.7 9 In
O'Connor, the record was replete with evidence of conversations the
patient had had over a number of years with friends and relatives about
her abhorrence of the notion of prolonging the dying process through
77. See In re Westchester County Med. Ctr. ex rel. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 612 (N.Y.
1988); see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("[It] may well be constitutionally required [for a state to give effect to a surrogate's
decisions] to protect the patient's liberty interest in refusing medical treatment."); id. at 328
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he State generally must.. . repose the choice with the person whom
the patient himself would most likely have chosen as proxy .... ").
78. An "instruction" directive, popularly referred to as a "living will."
79. In re O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607.
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medical means.8" Nonetheless, the New York Court of Appeals refused
to find that she had authorized the termination of a feeding tube before
losing decisionmaking capacity because
there is nothing, other than speculation, to persuade the fact finder
that her expressions were more than immediate reactions to the unset-
tling experience of seeing or hearing of another's unnecessarily pro-
longed death. Her comments - that she would never want to lose her
dignity before she passed away, that nature should be permitted to
take its course, that it is "monstrous" to use life-support machinery -
are, in fact, no different than those that many of us might make after
witnessing an agonizing death. Similarly, her statements to the effect
that she would not want to be a burden to anyone are the type of
statements that older people frequently, almost invariably make. If
such statements were routinely held to be clear and convincing proof
of a general intent to decline all medical treatment once incompe-
tency sets in, few nursing home patients would ever receive life-sus-
taining medical treatment in the future. The aged and infirm would
be placed at grave risk if the law uniformly but unrealistically treated
the expression of such sentiments as a calm and deliberate resolve to
decline all life-sustaining medical assistance once the speaker is
silenced by mental disability.8'
Whatever the requisite degree of specificity may be, the validity,
and thus the probative value, of the patient's statements are significantly
enhanced if those statements have been committed to writing in an
instruction directive. While no rule of law would have required an
instruction directive (unless the Florida Supreme Court had explicitly
established such a requirement) had the Schindlers prevailed, a populace
fearful that its wishes would be ignored would certainly have been
handed a substantial incentive to execute instruction directives.
That might not be a bad thing. Many have bemoaned the low
advance-directive execution rate for years.82 Instruction directives may,
however, create as many problems as they solve. There probably would
80. Id. at 614.
81. Id.
82. Figures from 2005 polls range from about 30% to about 40%. Compare Poll: Keep
Feeding Tube Out, CBS NEWS, Mar. 23, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/231
opinion/polls/main682674.shtml (33%), and Linda Lyons, Last Wishes: Half of Americans Have
Written Wills, GALLUP POLL NEWS SERV., June 7, 2005, http://www.galluppoll.conmcontent/?ci=
16660&pg=l (40%), with Washington Post-ABC News Poll: Schiavo Case, WASH. POST, Mar. 22,
2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/polltrend_032205.html (42%). This
is a dramatic increase from the 20% or lower level in the early 1990s. See PEw RESEARCH CTR.
FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, REFLECTIONS OF THE TIMES: THE RIGHT TO DIE 9 (1990), http://
people-press.org/reports/pdf/19900610.pdf. A study based on government data from the mid-
1980s found a living will completion rate of less than 10%. Laura C. Hanson & Eric Rodgman,
The Use of Living Wills at the End of Life: A National Study, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1018,
1018 (1996).
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not have been a Schiavo case if Terri Schiavo had executed a directive
stating, "if I'm ever in a persistent vegetative state and am being kept
alive by a feeding tube, and if I don't recover after one year, I want the
feeding tube removed, and I want to be allowed to die peacefully."
Under these circumstances, even if there had been a Schiavo case, the
likelihood that it would have become the circus it became would have
been remote. But if Schiavo's advance directive had stated, "I never
want to be kept alive by extraordinary treatment," or, "if I'm ever in a
persistent vegetative state, I don't want to be kept alive by extraordinary
treatment," or even, "if I'm ever in a persistent vegetative state and do
not recover after one year, I don't want to be kept alive by extraordinary
treatment," the question would have remained whether a feeding tube
was "treatment," let alone "extraordinary treatment." In that situation, it
is unlikely any of the actors in the Schiavo matter would have reacted
differently from the way they reacted absent an instruction directive.
Other imprecise instruction directives would have likely produced simi-
lar results. Thus, some courts may require precise instruction directives,
and there are an alarming and possibly infinite number of ways to create
imprecision.
If the applicable law required that an instruction directive provide
precision, another kind of difficulty arises because such instruction
directives essentially eliminate discretion. In other words, the greater
the degree of precision required, the less discretion a surrogate has to
make a decision in circumstances that vary from those contemplated in
the instruction directive. It is highly unlikely that this is a desirable
outcome in end-of-life decisionmaking, a process in which many unan-
ticipated variables exist. Of course, if life per se is a pearl beyond price,
and if it is better to err on the side of keeping a person alive when what
he or she wants is uncertain, then this is a desirable outcome. This is
not, however, the outcome that the legal consensus has sanctioned for
three decades. If public opinion polls are correct, this is also not the
outcome that most people want for themselves.83
Would a proxy directive eliminate the problems posed by decision-
making under the subjective standard? Or more precisely, does an
advance directive that appoints a proxy but does not give instructions
about future treatment satisfy the subjective standard? No case has yet
83. See David W. Moore, Three in Four Americans Support Euthanasia, GALLUP POLL NEWS
SERV., May 17, 2005, http://www.galluppoll.com/content/?ci=16333&pg=l ("When it comes to
being 'in a persistent vegetative state with no hope of for significant recovery,' 85% of Americans
say they would want to have their life support removed."); Poll: Keep Feeding Tube Out, supra
note 82 ("In general, 73 percent say if a patient is in a coma with no brain activity, a close family
member should have the right to tell the doctor to remove the feeding tube and let the patient
die.").
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decided this question, though at least two have addressed it in dicta, both
concluding that a proxy directive will suffice.84 This conclusion is not
necessarily consistent with the subjective standard's rationale, which is
to ensure that a decision made for an incompetent patient will effectuate
that person's actual wishes. Allowing a surrogate - even one the patient
selects - to make a decision, possibly without any actual knowledge of
the patient's wishes, is seemingly at odds with the subjective standard
because it permits the surrogate to exercise the kind of broad decision-
making discretion usually associated with the substituted judgment stan-
dard. Thus, if under the aegis of the subjective standard a surrogate
(albeit a patient-designated surrogate) is permitted to exercise an equal
degree of discretion as a surrogate operating under the substituted judg-
ment standard, has any change really been worked in the law? Indeed,
in this scenario it is unclear whether any difference between the substi-
tuted judgment standard and the subjective standard exists. Instead, this
seeming inconsistency appears to creative an incentive for patients to
appoint a healthcare proxy if the patient wishes to avoid drafting an
instruction directive that addresses every conceivable treatment
contingency.
Thus, another outcome of a Schindler victory in the Schiavo case
would have been increased uncertainty about the need for an advance
directive and about what kind of advance directive to create. Reliance
on either an oral directive or a proxy directive in a subjective standard
state invites the risk - far more so than in a substituted judgment stan-
dard state - that one's wishes will be ignored. On the other hand, reli-
ance on an instruction directive runs the risk that it will provide no
guidance or misleading guidance.
E. Tube Feeding
Terri Schiavo was kept alive by a feeding tube. After a decision
was made to allow her to die, terminating tube feeding ultimately led to
Ten-i's death. The question whether to terminate tube feeding first arose
in a litigated case in 198385 and has been the subject of frequent litiga-
tion,8 6 despite the Supreme Court's approval in Cruzan in 1990 and con-
siderable controversy in academic and professional literature concerning
84. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("[It] may well be constitutionally required [for a state to give effect to the surrogate's
decisions] to protect the patient's liberty interest in refusing medical treatment."); id. at 328
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he State generally must.., repose the choice with the person whom
the patient himself would most likely have chosen as proxy ...."); In re O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at
612.
85. Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
86. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 11, at 6-79 to -82.
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end-of-life decisions. Simply stated, the opponents of tube feeding ter-
mination claim that it denies the ordinary sustenance we would provide
to any person, and thus a moral obligation arises to continue the feed-
ing.87 Others claim that denial of tube feeding is a cruel, painful, and
barbaric way for a person to die.88 Nonetheless, the virtually unanimous
judicial position, including that of the U.S. Supreme Court, 89 has been
that tube feeding is artificial nutrition and hydration and is a medically
administered way of keeping people alive, and as such it is subject to the
same rules of continuation or termination as are other forms of medical
treatment. 90
There is substantial evidence that death by dehydration is not nec-
essarily a painful or even an unpleasant way to die,91 especially for peo-
87. Edward J. Furton, On the Death of Terri Schiavo, 30 ETHICS & MEDICS 3 (2005),
reprinted in THE CASE OF TERRI SCHIAVO 247, 249 (Arthur L. Caplan et al., eds., 2006) ("We do
not take food and water away from people simply because they suffer diminished cognitive
ability. All of us need food and water to sustain life. The fact that these are administered via a
plastic tube is no more relevant than the fact that you and I use plates, utensils, and cups. These
too are 'artificial' means of preserving life.").
88. E.g., WESLEY J. SMrrH, FORCED EXIT 50 (1997) (citing interview with Dr. William Burke)
("A conscious person would feel it [dehydration] just as you or I would. They will go into
seizures. Their skin cracks, their tongue cracks, their lips crack. They may have nosebleeds
because of the drying of the mucus membranes, and heaving and vomiting might ensue because of
the drying out of the stomach lining. They feel the pangs of hunger and thirst. Imagine going one
day without a glass of water! Death by dehydration takes ten to fourteen days. It is an extremely
agonizing death." (italicization omitted)); see also Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497
N.E.2d 626, 641 n.2 (Mass. 1986) (Lynch, J., dissenting in part) ("Removal of the G tube would
likely create various effects from the lack of hydration and nutrition, leading ultimately to death.
Brophy's mouth would dry out and become caked or coated with thick material. His lips would
become parched and cracked. His tongue would swell, and might crack.... At some point within
five days to three weeks his major organs, including his lungs, heart, and brain, would give out
and he would die. The judge found that death by dehydration is extremely painful and
uncomfortable for a human being. The judge could not rule out the possibility that Paul Brophy
could experience pain in such a scenario. Paul Brophy's attending physician described death by
dehydration as cruel and violent.").
89. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
90. AM. NURSES ASS'N, COMPENDIUM OF AM. NURSES Ass'N POSITION STATEMENTS 97
(1996) ("Medically provided nutrition and hydration should be distinguished from the provision of
food and water. Food and water given to patients by mouth is the usual means of providing
nutrition to patients. There are, however, situations in which nutrition can only be provided by
artificial means. The provision of nourishment and hydration by medical means (i.e., through
tubes inserted into the stomach, intestine, or blood vessel) is qualitatively different from merely
assisting with feeding."); CODE OF MED. ETHICS § 2.20 (Am. Med. Ass'n 2007); Bd. of Dirs., Am.
Thoracic Soc'y, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Therapy, 144 AM. REV.
RESPIRATORY DISEASE 726, 726 (1991); Exec. Bd., Am. Acad. of Neurology, Position of the
American Academy of Neurology on Certain Aspects of the Care and Management of the
Persistent Vegetative State Patient, 39 NEUROLOGY 125, 125 (1989).
91. L. Ganzini, Nurse's Experiences with Hospice Patients Who Refuse Food and Fluids to
Hasten Death, 349 NEw ENG. J. MED. 359 (2005); Robert M. McCann et al., Comfort Care for
Terminally Ill Patients: The Appropriate Use of Nutrition and Hydration, 272 JAMA 1263
(1994); H. Roeline et al., Discomfort in Nursing Home Patients with Severe Dementia in Whom
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pie who are already severely debilitated because of a life-threatening
condition.92 If it does produce any unpleasant symptoms, medical per-
sonnel can control the symptoms in a variety of ways.9 3 Furthermore,
when a person is in a PVS, there are no painful or even unpleasant side
effects because people in a PVS are incapable of perception.94 Family,
friends, and other third-party observers' suffering as a result of watching
someone die from dehydration is an irrelevant legal concern. The
unpleasant aspects of dehydration that may disturb family members,
such as cracked oral and nasal passages,95 can be attended to with proper
nursing and hygienic patient care.96
Had the Florida courts found that a PVS patient's death from dehy-
dration is impermissible, it would have signaled an unprecedented
retreat by an appellate court from the position that artificial nutrition and
hydration is a form of medical treatment and therefore may be withheld
or withdrawn on the same basis as all other medical treatments. Such a
ruling's reach would have been profound. If it were impermissible to
withdraw feeding tubes from PVS patients - patients who can perceive
nothing - a fortiori it would also be impermissible to remove feeding
tubes from patients with a lesser degree of incapacity who might actu-
ally experience dehydration's purported negative effects. It is not clear
Artificial Nutrition and Hydration Is Forgone, 165 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1729 (2005); R.
Viola, G. Wells & J. Peterson, The Effects of Fluid Status and Fluid Therapy on the Dying, 13 J.
OF PALLIATIVE CARE 41 (1997).
92. McCann et al., supra note 92, at 1265 ("We found that patients with terminal illness can
experience comfort despite minimal if any intake of food or fluids. .... Those patients able to
communicate consistently reaffirmed our hypothesis that lack of food and fluids sufficient to
deplete losses did not cause them suffering, as long as mouth care was provided and thirst
alleviated with sips of water. In fact, in nine instances, patients experienced abdominal discomfort
and nausea when they ate to please their families."); see also Roeline et al., supra note 92, at
1733.
93. See Phyllis Schmitz & Merry O'Brien, Observations on Nutrition and Hydration in Dying
Cancer Patients, in By No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS: THE CHOICE TO FORGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
FOOD AND WATER 29, 36 (Joanne Lynn ed., 1989) ("To provide reassurance and ensure
understanding, we review with the family the comfort techniques and hydration measures we
envision using. These include frequent mouth care and body lotioning. If the swallow reflex is
intact, we will administer small amounts of water, often using a small syringe. Vaseline will be
applied liberally to keep lips moist and a room humidifier will be used."); McCann et al., supra
note 92, at 1263 ("In all patients, symptoms of hunger, thirst, and dry mouth could be alleviated,
usually with small amounts of food, fluids, and/or by the application of ice chips and lubrication
to the lips. Comfort care included use of narcotics for relief of pain or shortness of breath in 94%
of patients.").
94. See McCann, supra note 92, at 1265.
95. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 641 n.2 (Mass. 1986)
(Lynch, J., dissenting in part).
96. See, e.g., Sharon Jackonen, Dehydration and Hydration in the Terminally Ill: Care
Considerations, NURSING FORUM, July-Sept. 1997, at 5, 11; Louise A. Printz, Is Withholding
Hydration a Valid Comfort Measure in the Terminally Ill?, GERIATRICS, Nov. 1988, at 84, 85-86;
Paul C. Rousseau, How Fluid Deprivation Affects the Terminally Ill, RN, Jan. 1991, at 73, 76.
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where the logic of such a ruling would lead. Perhaps forgoing ventilator
support, for example, should be prohibited because breathing is a basic,
natural function. And what about blood circulation? Or renal blood
cleansing? These, too, are treatments undertaken to sustain a patient.
This also raises the old problem of withdrawing versus withholding
treatment, long ago thought to have been resolved by the conclusion that
there is no morally, and no legally, relevant difference between the
two.97 If it is no longer permissible to terminate artificial nutrition and
hydration unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the patient,
before losing decisionmaking capacity requested termination, would
physicians become more reluctant to initiate tube feeding for fear that
they would be compelled to continue it? If that were the case, then
patients who might otherwise survive would die simply because of the
difficulty in predicting who will benefit from a feeding tube. In cases
like Terri Schiavo's, where the brain injury progresses to a PVS, predic-
tive ability regarding the utility of inserting a feeding tube becomes all
the more difficult. This is exacerbated by the relabeling of medical
treatments with charged words like "sustenance."
State laws prohibiting the termination of artificial nutrition, hydra-
tion, and other forms of medical treatment would be of questionable
constitutionality. Even if the label were changed, the provision of food,
water, oxygen, or blood purification without the patient's authorization,
either directly or through a legally authorized representative, would con-
stitute a restraint on liberty, thus invoking the Fourteenth Amendment's
protections.98
V. BEYOND THE CONSENSUS: INAPPROPRIATE USE OF
HEALTHCARE RESOURCES
Had the Schindlers won, there might have been other undesirable
social consequences, apart from the legal consequences. One such con-
sequence concerns the appropriate use of healthcare resources.
People in a PVS do not recover. That is what the "P" in PVS
stands for - persistent. Persistent does not mean maybe persistent, kind
of persistent, or temporarily persistent. It means lasting, unrelenting,
97. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1234 (N.J. 1985). See generally MEISEL &
CERMINARA, supra note 11, at 5-13 to -14.
98. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 288 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("The State's imposition of medical treatment on an unwilling competent adult
necessarily involves some form of restraint and intrusion. A seriously ill or dying patient whose
wishes are not honored may feel a captive of the machinery required for life-sustaining measures
or other medical interventions. Such forced treatment may burden that individual's liberty
interests as much as any state coercion." (internal citations omitted)).
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and enduring.99 Continuing to provide life support to PVS patients,
including artificial nutrition and hydration administered via a feeding
tube, requires the efforts of an array of healthcare professionals and their
assistants including physicians, nurses, nutritionists, and others. This
means that scarce healthcare resources, both human resources and finan-
cial resources, are devoted to caring for patients whose improvement is
unlikely. Although their organs, except their brains, can be functionally
maintained, they will never again be sentient beings. Compelled care to
patients who can never derive any conscious benefit only contributes to
the stress, disillusionment, and demoralization of an increasing number
of healthcare workers.
A Schindler victory might have led to profound increases in finan-
cial costs for the healthcare system. Healthcare resources are finite and
providing additional resources to certain patients necessitates withhold-
ing resources from others. For example, hospitals and nursing homes
sometimes run out of beds, and staffing levels are often stretched thin.
At least of equal significance is the fact that being required to keep PVS
patients alive could, over time, entail providing significantly more
resources to an increased number of people who lack the ability to bene-
fit from those resources. 1"
Had the Schindlers won, the number of similar situations and their
attendant costs would certainly have risen, though it is impossible to
estimate the extent of this increase. The increase would depend on
numerous factors including, but not limited to, the decisions that patients
make in advance directives, the latitude that surrogates would have in
making decisions in the absence of instruction directives, and what deci-
99. But cf. Voss, supra note 3 (study suggesting that patients in a minimally conscious state,
which involves less severe brain damage than a PVS, may be capable of regenerating brain cell
segments). However, given the length of time that Terri Schiavo was in a PVS, it was virtually
certain there was no chance of recovery. See Karen Kaplan, As Man Lay in Coma-Like State, His
Brain Was Busy Rebuilding, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 2006, at A23 ("Neurologists believe that the
longer a patient remains in a minimally conscious or persistent vegetative state, the lower the
chances for recovery."). The fact that Terri Schiavo was in a PVS with no hope of recovery was
subsequently confirmed by her autopsy. See JON R. THOGMARTIN, DIST. SIX MED. EXAM'R
OFFICE, REPORT OF ATrroPsY FOR THERESA SCHIAVO (2005), available at http://www6.miami.edu/
ethics/schiavo/pdf files/061505-autopsy.pdf.
100. The number of individuals in a PVS in the United States is unknown. In 1983, the
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research observed that at that time, "[tihe only prevalence survey available estimates
that Japan has about 2000 permanently unconscious patients in long-term care, which, if the
prevalence were the same (and if differing definitions of terms did not cause substantial error),
would imply less than 5000 at any one time in the United States." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N,
DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 15, at 178 n.15 (citations omitted). A more recent estimate is
that there are between 10,000 and 25,000 adults and between 4,000 and 10,000 children in a PVS
in the United States. Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent
Vegetative Sate (First of Two Parts), 330 Naw ENG. J. MED. 1499, 1503 (1994).
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sions surrogates would actually make if they in fact had the discretion to
do so. If we were considering only Terri Schiavo, these costs would not
be so intolerable. But if Schiavo and its progeny had set a different
precedent, a multitude of similar cases would occur over time.
It is unlikely that these increases in healthcare cost would be signif-
icant in relation to the United States' total healthcare costs. Nonethe-
less, in a system where healthcare costs already represent a significant
proportion of the gross domestic product' ° ' and where about one of
every six individuals lacks health insurance,1 0 2 providing additional
treatment for more patients who cannot perceive the fact that they are
alive and who will never improve cannot possibly be the best use of
those resources. Some people would assert that this use of resources
would play a valuable and symbolic role in demonstrating our societal
commitment to life. But commitment to mere existence, instead of com-
mitment to providing medical treatment to those who can benefit from
it, may be an important symbol of societal values gone astray.
VI. CONCLUSION
Now that the dust has settled from the Schiavo case, it is easier to
see it for what it is. Schiavo should serve as a reminder of how end-of-
life issues can bitterly divide families and thus as a reminder to engage
in advance end-of-life planning. This reminder's strength will unfortu-
nately wane with the passage of time, as it did after Quinlan, Cruzan,
and all the other high profile end-of-life cases. Schiavo should serve as
a reminder that end-of-life cases are best dealt with in the clinical set-
ting, where the patient and family's privacy can be maintained, out of
101. Cynthia Smith et al., National Health Spending in 2004: Recent Slowdown Led by
Prescription Drug Spending, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 186, 186 (2006).
102. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION & NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., SERIES 10, No. 229, SUMMARY OF HEALTH
STATISTICS FOR THE U.S. POPULATION: NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, 2004, at 7, 37
(2006), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr-l0/srIO_229.pdf ("Among persons
under age 65 years, 173 million (69%) had private health insurance, 30 million (12%) had
Medicaid, and 41 million (17%) were uninsured."). One of the ways of measuring the overall
success or failure of the United States healthcare system is to look at the 31 other countries that
rank ahead of the United States in infant mortality rates, despite our per capita expenditures being
higher. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD HEALTH STATISTICS 2006, at 37 (2006), available at http://
www.who.int/whosis/whostat2006.pdf; Gerard F. Anderson et al., Health Care Spending and Use
of Information Technology in OECD Countries, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 819 (2006) ("In 2003, U.S.
health spending per capita was $5,635, almost two and a half times more than the comparable
median for OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries ($2,280
per capita)."). Perhaps a more precise ranking is that of the CIA, which ranks U.S. infant
mortality at 48th in the world. See CIA FACTBOOK, RANK ORDER - LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH
(2007), https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2102rank.html.
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the media's glare and the craving for grandstanding by politicians that
the media can generate.
Had the Schindlers won the Schiavo case, the legal consensus about
end-of-life decisionmaking would have suffered serious setbacks, if it
had not been sent into total disarray. In the first instance, that would
have only been the legal consequence, but legal consequences inevitably
have social consequences, sometimes widespread. A victory for the
Schindlers would have increased the uncertainty about how certain sur-
rogates need to be about incompetent patients' wishes. It would have
also added to the uncertainty among physicians and other healthcare pro-
fessionals about decisionmaking for incompetent patients who have war-
ring family factions. It would have strengthened the need for advance
directives while adding uncertainty about whether a proxy directive is
adequate or an instruction directive is required, too. And it would have
made it even more difficult than it already is to resist the pressure to
accept tube feeding in patients for whom it will do nothing more than
prolong the process of dying." 3 And all of these consequences would
have increased the likelihood that end-of-life decisions would end up in
litigation rather than being resolved in the clinical setting, thereby turn-
ing private tribulations into public trials.
From a legal perspective, the Schiavo case is pure anticlimax
because after all the litigation and legislation - not to mention fighting,
and shouting, and even shoving - it did not work any changes in the
law."° History will view it as another in a series of high profile cases in
103. The impact of a ruling that erodes or overturns the consensus position that tube feeding is
a medical procedure that may be forgone in accordance with the same standard and procedures as
any other medical procedure would be especially significant because of the large number of
elderly and demented nursing home patients who have feeding tubes. See Susan L. Mitchell et al.,
Clinical and Organizational Factors Associated with Feeding Tube Use Among Nursing Home
Residents with Advanced Cognitive Impairment, 290 JAMA 73 (2006) (more than one-third of
severely cognitively impaired residents have feeding tubes).
104. See Maya Bell, Governor Abandons Feeding-Tube Efforts, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 13,
2006, at B7. In many other states, bills were introduced to amend statutes to make it more
difficult to terminate artificial nutrition and hydration by requiring an advance directive
specifically requesting its termination. Most of these bills were not enacted. One exception is the
North Dakota advance directive statute, where in order to forgo artificial nutrition and hydration,
either the patient must have executed an advance directive to that effect or "the attending
physician has determined that the administration of nutrition or hydration is inappropriate because
the nutrition or hydration cannot be physically assimilated by the principal or would be physically
harmful or would cause unreasonable physical pain to the principal." N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-
06.5-09.6 (2005). The constitutionality of such a provision is questionable. See Cruzan v. Dir.,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Another type of
statutory change was affected in Louisiana in which the surrogate decisionmaking statute was
amended to prohibit a spouse from acting as the patient's surrogate if the spouse is cohabiting
"with another person in the manner of married persons." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §40:1299.58.2(14)
(2006).
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which the consensus - the legal consensus, the clinical-professional con-
sensus, indeed the societal consensus - about end-of-life decisionmak-
ing further solidified.
The consensus developed by small steps before the Schiavo case,
and it will, in time, be seen as just another small step. Schiavo is a small
step in a rejection of vitalism and a reaffirmation of end-of-life decisions
based on one's own values as expressed by a formerly self-determining
person. It is another small step in the rejection of enslavement to medi-
cal technology and the acceptance of the inevitability of death. Schiavo
is, in the final analysis, a reaffirmation of the consensus on end-of-life
decisionmaking. Had the Schindlers won, it would have been otherwise.
